The Crime-Crime Prevention Relationship: A Manchester Case Study by Hirschfield, Alex & Newton, Andrew D.
University of Huddersfield Repository
Hirschfield, Alex and Newton, Andrew D.
The Crime-Crime Prevention Relationship: A Manchester Case Study
Original Citation
Hirschfield, Alex and Newton, Andrew D. (2008) The Crime-Crime Prevention Relationship: A 
Manchester Case Study. Built Environment, 34 (1). pp. 104-120. ISSN 02637960 
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/2777/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
Title: The crime-crime prevention relationship: A Manchester case study. 
Authors: Alex Hirschfield and Andrew Newton 
ABSTRACT 
 
Crime data analysis and the identification of crime ‘hot spots’ is now commonplace in police forces 
and local authorities in Britain. Significantly less attention has been paid to the systematic collection 
and analysis of data on crime prevention. This reflects a preoccupation with the problems (crime, anti 
social behaviour) and the context in which they occur (areas with poor natural surveillance, know crime 
generators) but a lack of attention to the attributes of the response (what is being done where, when and 
in what dosage). This paper breaks new ground by relating a crime problem, domestic burglary, to a 
burglary-prevention intervention (Target Hardening) using data for the City of Manchester in NW 
England. The results show a degree of mismatch between allocation of crime prevention and 
concentrations of burglary. The implications for further research and developments in this area are 
discussed. 
 
Introduction  
 
Much of the empirical research on exploring crime in urban areas focuses upon the 
spatial and temporal distribution of recorded crime and ‘incidents’ such as anti-social 
behaviour, neighbour disputes and other incivilities. 
  
Using various combinations of recorded crime, incidents and contextual data on 
populations and land use, researchers and crime analysts typically go on to produce 
material that identifies the magnitude, concentration and prevalence of crime and 
disorder  in urban areas. This might show how crime levels and patterns compare with 
other areas and in some cases how these patterns and comparisons change over time 
(Hirschfield, 2005). Outputs are often in the form of crime rate league tables, graphs 
and maps that reveal geographical and temporal ‘hot spots’. The latter are sometimes 
superimposed upon base maps depicting street networks, building foot prints and 
socio-demographic data (e.g. residential neighbourhood classifications). These types 
of analysis can produce useful insights into the manifestation of crime and disorder in 
urban areas and how these relate to other aspects of the physical and social 
environment (Chainey and Ratcliffe, 2006). 
 
In common with other forms of analysis that profile urban problems (e.g. studies of 
deprivation, health inequalities, housing stress), the focus is predominantly problem-
oriented. It concentrates on the manifestation of problems experienced within and by 
communities that need to be resolved through more effective policy interventions. The 
predominant concern is with the demand side; the nature and extent of needs within 
the community for a safer, fairer and healthier society.  
 
The danger in concentrating solely on recorded crime and other needs-based measures 
is that little or no attention is paid to the supply side, that is, to the temporal and 
spatial dispensation of ameliorative policy interventions. Whilst there is abundant 
research and indeed theory on crime patterns, how they are generated and how best to 
delineate crime hot spots (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1995, Boba, 2005) with just 
a few exceptions (e.g. Bowers et al 2004) very little attention is given to patterns of 
crime prevention investment, how they can be explained and crucially, how they 
relate to crime. 
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The fact that crime data analysis widely is practised in Britain is not surprising given 
the long tradition of reporting and recording crime. The Home Office has a coding 
scheme for different types of offence that is adopted by all police forces in England 
and Wales. Attempts are also being made towards achieving consistency in the 
recording of calls for service to the police (Home Office et al, 2007; Audit 
Commission 2006). 
 
However, there are no equivalent arrangements for reporting, or indeed, recording 
what has been done in terms of crime prevention interventions. Local databases may 
be constructed for some interventions but this is unsystematic and on an ad hoc basis. 
The Home Office does not have a coding frame for classifying interventions nor does 
any agency at national level. In fact, this is not routinely undertaken at any level of 
governance.  
 
Just by considering the possibility of being able to produce such information raises the 
prospect of being able to explore entire new research areas. If sufficiently detailed 
information on the type, location, timing, source and levels of crime prevention 
activity could be made available it would be possible to pose and attempt to answer 
questions such as: 
  How geographically concentrated is crime prevention within different urban 
areas and neighbourhoods?  What is being implemented where and by whom?  Which areas have significantly high and significantly low levels of crime 
prevention investment?  Do areas with high levels of one type of crime prevention have high levels of 
another? 
 
There are obvious parallels with crime data analysis in terms of deriving crime 
prevention prevalence rates (e.g. per capita) and identifying hot spots of crime 
prevention activity. New variables, indices and analytical approaches may need to be 
developed to measure the alignment between the location and timing of crime and that 
of crime prevention. This begs the question of the extent to which crime pattern 
analysis tools (e.g. spatial overlap analysis, Nearest Neighbour Analysis, Kernel 
Density Estimation,) can be used to analyse crime prevention activity patterns. 
Research questions that arise when relating crime prevention to crime might include: 
  How do crime prevention measures correspond to the location and timing of 
different types of crime?  How far is there an ‘inverse prevention law’ (i.e. where areas with lower crime 
receive more attention)?  Is there a variation in crime prevention investment across communities with 
similar levels and patterns of crime?  How can the coalescence between crime prevention and crime risk be 
measured?  How can crime prevention be better aligned with crime risk?  What the are theoretical implications that stem from relating crime to crime 
prevention? 
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The ability to provide answers to such questions is bound to have policy implications. 
This would be especially true if such analyses identify substantial duplication of 
activity, mismatches between the timing, location and nature of urban crime problems 
and the policy response, contradictory interventions and a lack of synergy. The 
outcome might be a call for rationalizing agency responses to crime. Alternatively, a 
comparative analysis of crime prevention and crime might shed light on how far crime 
change can be attributed to policy interventions; the inability to do so being a 
persistent dilemma that confronts most policy evaluators (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, 
Eck, 2005). 
 
The addition of policy data introduces a new dimension to crime analysis. It also 
potentially modifies existing, largely problem-focused resource allocation models for 
crime prevention. 
 
A simplified conventional crime prevention decision making model is shown in 
Figure 1a. It begins with the use of crime data and crime pattern analysis to identify 
local crime problems (a). The evidence base of ‘what works’ in crime prevention (e.g. 
Home Office toolkits) is then interrogated (b) and this informs potentially effective 
policy interventions that are short-listed, appraised, costed and selected (c). These are 
then tailored to local crime problems and targeted to where and when offences are 
found using intelligence from crime pattern analysis (d). Hopefully the interventions 
will impact upon crime. However, in applying this model there is the question as to 
whether it is sufficient to implement intervention policies based solely upon crime and 
land use data. 
  
Figure 1 Simplified Models of Crime Prevention Resource Allocation 
 
1A: The Conventional Model 
 
 
 
1B: The Refined Model 
 
 
 
(a) Crime 
Patterns 
(b) Crime Prevention Evidence 
Base 
( c) Selection of Crime 
Prevention Measure 
(d) Targeting 
Crime 
Prevention 
Measure  
(e) Existing 
Distribution of 
Crime 
Prevention 
(a) Crime Patterns (b) Crime Prevention Evidence 
Base 
( c) Selection of Crime Prevention 
Measure 
(d) Targeting Crime 
Prevention Measure  
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The inclusion of crime prevention activity data adds a new stage to the model. This is 
shown in Figure 1b. In the modified model, crime pattern analysis still plays a role (a) 
and knowledge on best practice in crime prevention is still accessed (b). The 
difference is that there then follows a systematic analysis of what is being provided 
already in terms of crime prevention and how this relates to crime(c). Intelligence on 
this informs both the selection of appropriate interventions (e.g. to maximise synergy 
with what currently exists)(d) and decisions on where, when and how they are to be 
deployed(e). 
 
By combining intelligence on both crime and prevention activity, the refined model  
can be used to identify where there are gaps in current provision, to alter the 
deployment of existing measures (where feasible) and to coalesce with crime and 
maximise synergy with new interventions. 
 
The above discussion provides a flavour of the breadth of issues that would need to be 
resolved in what is clearly a research frontier. Some of the questions posed above can 
be explored in part by examining, in some detail, the relationship between a specific 
crime category and a tried and tested method of crime prevention. The rest of this 
paper describes the aims, methods and results of a study of a crime problem, domestic 
burglary, and a policy response, target hardening, within the City of Manchester. It  
breaks new ground by bringing together data on the two in order to shed light on how 
the dispensation of target hardening over space and time relates to that of domestic 
burglary.  
 
 
The Manchester Project 
 
Burglary has been a key priority for Manchester Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnership (CDRP) since its inception following the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. 
From 2001 the CDRP secured funding from the Government’s Neighbourhood 
Renewal Unit as part of the Places Project. The latter represented a collaborative 
approach between central and local government piloting work with three selected 
local authority districts - Manchester, Nottingham and Southwark - to explore the 
action needed to accelerate progress towards meeting government performance targets 
(Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, 2004). Burglary was chosen in Manchester because of 
the large fluctuations in the rates of burglary the need for the City to meet its Public 
Service Agreement target in 2003/4. 
 
Extensive scrutiny from this initiative identified a need to provide better evaluation of 
crime reduction initiatives, by using a more targeted approach to analysis and 
evaluation.  Government Office North West and Manchester City Council   
commissioned the University of Huddersfield to carry out some of this evaluation 
research and also to support and train Manchester’s crime analyst so that she   could 
continue to provide this information post project. 
 
The overall aim of this study was to shed light on how far the City  was focusing its 
burglary reduction programme on the properties and in the areas of greatest risk and 
what impact this was having on levels of domestic burglary. A key element of the 
programme was ‘target hardening’, namely, the fitting of security devices such as 
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window locks, bolts, security chains, alarms and other measures to residential 
dwellings in order to deter offenders (Hamilton-Smith and Kent, 2005). 
 
This was to be examined across the City generally but also in greater depth within two 
target wards where burglary levels were identified as being particularly high. The 
wards in question were those of Harpurhey and Longsight. Both neighbourhoods were 
areas of substantial disadvantage but were distinctive in terms of their demographic 
profiles. Longsight had a sizeable student population, high unemployment and an 
over-representation of BME groups; 36% were Asian or Asian British and 9% were 
black or black British. Harpurhey also experienced high unemployment and social 
deprivation but had a predominantly white population (92%) and was not a student 
area. 
 
The availability of comprehensive data on target hardening activity from the City of 
Manchester spanning four years provided an opportunity to tabulate, map and analyse 
burglary and the response to burglary on equal terms. Both the burglary and target 
hardening data have been captured at the individual address level, cover overlapping 
time periods, and contain a wealth of information. For burglary, this included address, 
postcode, police beat and ward, time of day, day of week, the offender’s Modus 
Operandi (MO), and the outcome in terms of an attempted or successful burglary. For 
target hardening, information was provided on address, start date and completion date, 
whether proactive or reactive, housing tenure, and contractor. Both data sets can be 
mapped at the address level using a 12 figure grid reference that pinpoints the 
property to a one metre accuracy. 
 
Some Important Questions  
 
The research results presented in this paper focus predominantly on the spatial 
patterns of burglary and target hardening activity and how the combination of the two 
can inform resource allocation. 
 
It was envisaged at the outset that the data would allow a number of questions to be 
explored. Some of these were posed at the aggregate or area level and could be 
explored by tabulating data on burglary and target hardening activity for the City’s 32 
wards. 
 
Analyses at ward level enabled questions to be explored about the geography of 
burglary and that of target hardening. For example, which wards had the highest 
burglary rates?  Was there any change in the membership of this group of the ‘worst 
wards’ over time? What proportion of the City’s households did they contain? What 
proportion of the City’s burglaries? Was the share of the burglaries in proportion to 
that of the households? Were there any marked changes in the prevalence and in the 
concentration of burglary by ward over time? 
 
A similar set of questions could be posed for target hardening. Thus, which wards saw 
the most activity in terms of target hardening? Was this steady over time or were there 
substantial fluctuations? How far was target hardening taking place in wards with the 
highest burglary rates? What happened to burglary rates in wards that had the highest 
levels of target hardening?  
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As well as a focus on these key questions, the study also sought to establish how far 
the target hardening programme had resulted in an improvement in the positions of 
the two target wards on domestic burglary relative to the rest of Manchester. This 
would involve examining whether, over time, the gap in burglary rates between these 
two wards and the remainder of Manchester had narrowed (representing 
‘convergence’) or indeed, had widened (i.e. divergence). Although it was possible to 
identify how far this had occurred using the burglary data, further analysis was 
required of the target hardening data to be able to correlate any observed changes in 
burglary to target hardening investment. Thus the gap between the two wards and the 
rest of Manchester in the target hardening rate (i.e. target hardened properties per 
1,000 households) had to be calculated and tracked over time.  
 
For certain analyses, other spatial units were used including the 2001 Census Output 
Areas and individual streets. 
 
Although the target hardening records contained a wealth of information they did not 
document what was carried out at each address or how much was spent on target 
hardening measures. Therefore, it was not possible to look at the relationship between 
the intensity of target hardening activity (policy dosage)and subsequent outcomes. 
 
Data and Methodology  
 
The study used a range of data sets provided by the community safety team at 
Manchester City Council. These comprised: 
  Police recoded crime data on domestic burglary spanning the period April 
2002 through to end of March 2005 (26,939 cases);  Population denominators for Manchester Wards from the 2001 Census;  Target Hardening Activity Data for the period January 2001 through to the end 
of May 2005 (16,776 cases);  The Ordnance Survey ADDRESS-POINT® Gazetteer covering Greater 
Manchester. 
 
The burglary data and target hardening records were imported into the MapInfo 
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) software (MapInfo 7.5) and the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 12 for processing and analysis. 
 
The MapInfo software was used for geo-coding (i.e. generating a mappable grid 
reference for each address), for mapping points (e.g. individual and repeat burglaries, 
target hardened properties) and for displaying burglary ‘hot spots’  and target 
hardened properties in relation to land use features (e.g. the street network).  
 
Once in a GIS, the burglary and target hardening records were related to other 
geographies for which digital boundary information is available. Thus the GIS was 
used to identify which cases occurred within each ward, police beat and Census 
Output Area. Aggregate statistics were then produced giving the number of burglaries 
and target hardened properties in each zone. 
  
As well as the total number of burgled and target hardened properties, additional 
information, such as the number of burglaries occurring in each month, quarter and 
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financial year, was derived. Similarly, aggregated target hardening data was produced  
giving the number of completions by month, and quarterly period for each area. 
 
The following analyses were conducted using these data sets: 
  Derivation of burglary/ target hardening counts, prevalence rates and 
concentration rates for Manchester wards; 
  Derivation of target ward versus rest of Manchester ratios for burglary and 
target hardening by financial year and quarterly time periods; 
  Correlation analysis between target hardening rates and burglary rates for 
Manchester Wards at different points in time; 
  Point mapping of burglaries and target hardened properties within each target 
ward; 
  Mapping of the top 15 streets for target hardening within each target ward in 
relation to the distribution of burglaries and repeat burglaries; 
  Derivation of measures of geographical clustering for burglaries (Nearest 
Neighbour Analysis); 
  Production of Resource Targeting Tables of burglary and target hardening at 
street level within each of the two target wards; 
  Measurement of the degree of convergence and divergence between the two 
target wards and the rest of Manchester in burglary and in target hardening 
rates by quarter for each financial year. 
 
Changes in both domestic burglary and the delivery of target hardening were explored   
across all wards in the City of Manchester, within the two target areas for the Places 
Initiative (Longsight and Harpurhey) and in the rest of Manchester City (i.e. 
Manchester minus the two target wards). More in-depth analyses using disaggregate 
address-level data enabled the concentration of both burglary and target hardening 
activity to be identified at individual street level. 
 
Both burglary and target hardening ratios were also derived. These express the 
burglary / target hardening rate in the areas of interest (e.g. in Longsight and 
Harpurhey) as a ratio to those in a wider reference area (e.g. in the remainder of 
Manchester). Where burglary / target hardening rates in the areas of interest are 
identical to those in the wider reference area, ratios have a value of 1.0. If burglary / 
target hardening rates in the areas of interest are twice as high as those in the wider 
reference area, the ratio will be to 2.0. When calculated for each time point these 
ratios provide an indication of how far the areas of interest are converging towards 
crime levels and protective measures found in the reference area or indeed are 
widening the gap with their reference area. The latter scenario is one of ‘divergence’ 
and indicates that burglary reduction and/or target hardening activity in the areas of 
interest are not keeping pace with those experienced elsewhere. 
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Key Findings 
 
Burglary and Target Hardening across Manchester City 
 
The availability of data for the whole of Manchester enabled some strategic analyses 
to be conducted on the overall patterning of burglary and target hardening across 
Manchester’s wards.  Figure 2 shows the percentage of all of Manchester’s burglaries 
(2002/3 – 2004/5) and target hardened properties (2001/02 – 2004/05) in each of 
Manchester’s 32 electoral wards. There was a notable difference between the two. 
Target hardening was more unevenly distributed and was not necessarily allocated to 
wards with the greatest number of burglaries. Bradford Ward alone saw 10% of all the 
City’s target hardening but contained just over 4% of Manchester’s burglaries and 
3.3% of its households. If the aim of crime prevention is to target resources in 
proportion to the size of the problem this does not seem to have happened in this case 
 
It is interesting to speculate that if confronted with a picture such as this early on 
whether or not the City Council would have altered its resource allocation. At least 
having data on crime prevention provides intelligence on how scarce resources might 
be better deployed. 
 
Table 1 compares each ward’s rank on target hardening with that on domestic 
burglary. The proportion of target hardening activity and the share Manchester's 
burglary accounted for by each ward is revealed and the percentage of the City’s 
households concentrated in each ward is also shown.. 
 
 
As is clear from both Table 1 and Figure 2, target hardening was more geographically 
concentrated than domestic burglary; 52% of all target hardening went into just nine 
of the 32 wards that collectively contained just over one-third of all domestic 
burglaries (36.6 per cent, Table 1). At the other end of the scale there were ten wards 
that had less than 10% of the City's target hardening but accounted for 25% of all 
burglaries. 
 
Despite these contrasts, there was some evidence of a relationship between each 
ward’s rank on burglary and that on target hardening. The Spearman's Rank 
correlation coefficient between the two was positive and significant (0.674 at the 0.01 
level). In other words, higher ranks on target hardening activity were generally 
associated with higher ranks on burglary rates. 
  
Further analyses correlated annual target hardening activity rates with burglary rates 
for the same year.  There was a moderate correlation in 2002/03 (a Pearson 
Coefficient of 0.364, significant at the 0.05 level), this became insignificant in 
2003/04 (0.320) but reached significance again in 2004/05 (0.543, significant at the 
0.01 level). All three correlations were positive. 
Ward-level Shares of Burglary and Target Hardening
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City Centre 
Charlestown 
Higher Blackley 
Brooklands 
Didsbury East 
Chorlton 
Didsbury West 
Chorlton Park 
Northenden 
Baguley 
Crumpsall 
Moston 
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Figure 2 The concentration of burglary and target hardening in each ward 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Financial Years: Target hardening 2001/2 – 2004/05; Burglary 2002/02 – 2004/05.
Table 1 Ranks on burglary and target hardening for Manchester Wards  
(Financial years 2002/ - 2004/05) 
 
  Ward 
Target 
Hardening 
Rank 
Burglary 
Rank 
Share of 
Burglary 
Share of 
Target 
Hardening 
Share of 
Households 
Cum- 
ulative 
Burglar
y 
Cum- 
ulative 
Target 
Hardening 
Cum- 
ulative 
Househol
ds 
1 Bradford        1 8 4.12 9.97 3.3 4.1 9.9 3.3 
2 Withington     2 1 4.05 6 2.4 8.2 16 5.7 
3 Old Moat       3 3 4.11 5.76 2.8 12.3 22 8.5 
4 Ancoats & Clayton          4 16 3.06 5.44 3.2 15.3 27 11.7 
5 Gorton North             5 6 4.57 5.44 3.5 19.9 33 15.2 
6 Moss Side     6 11 4.04 5.41 3.5 24 38 18.7 
7 Gorton South             7 7 5.23 6.09 4 29.2 44 22.7 
8 Levenshul
me                 
8 10 3.25 3.93 2.8 32.4 48 25.5 
9 Longsight     9 2 4.18 3.59 2.8 36.6 52 28.3 
10 Baguley         10 27 2.44 4.15 3.3 39.1 56 31.6 
11 Burnage        11 15 2.87 3.43 2.9 41.9 59 34.5 
12 Chorlton Park               12 21 2.42 3.48 3 44.3 63 37.5 
13 Harpurhey    13 4 5.89 4.97 4.4 50.2 68 41.9 
14 Brooklands    14 31 2.16 3.43 3.2 52.4 71 45.1 
15 Woodhous
e Park            15 14 3.28 3.31 3.2 55.7 74 48.3 
16 Miles Platting  16 17 3.49 3.11 3.7 59.2 77 52 
17 Fallowfield     17 13 2.57 1.93 2.4 61.7 79 54.4 
18 Moston          18 23 2.48 2.46 3.3 64.2 82 57.7 
19 Ardwick         19 9 3.96 2.13 3.3 68.2 84 61 
20 Rusholme      20 5 3.2 1.5 2.4 71.4 85 63.4 
21 Sharston        21 20 2.7 2.04 3.3 74.1 88 66.7 
22 Charlestow
n                    
22 30 2.06 1.76 3 76.1 89 69.7 
23 Hulme            23 12 3.33 1.57 3.1 79.5 91 72.8 
24 Whalley Range           24 18 2.8 1.53 3.1 82.3 92 75.9 
25 Northende
n                    
25 22 2.43 1.48 3.1 84.7 94 79 
26 Higher Blackley         26 29 2.13 1.27 3.1 86.8 95 82.1 
27 Cheetham     27 19 2.65 1.19 3.2 89.5 96 85.3 
28 Crumpsall      28 28 2.45 1.18 3.4 91.9 97 88.7 
29 Didsbury East               29 25 2.23 1.03 2.9 94.2 99 91.6 
30 Chorlton        30 24 2.28 0.9 3 96.4 99 94.6 
31 Didsbury West              31 26 2.31 0.54 3.1 98.7 100 97.7 
32 City Centre    32 32 1.25 0.01 2.4 100 100 100 
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Figure 3 shows the rate of target hardening per 1,000 households in the four wards 
with the highest burglary rates in all three years (these included Harpurhey and 
Longsight), the three wards with the lowest rates and the rest of Manchester. 
  
In the first two years of target hardening, there was very little difference in the target 
hardening rates between the top four wards on domestic burglary and the rest of 
Manchester. However, a sizeable difference opens up in the last two financial years 
with the target hardening rate significantly higher in the highest burglary areas than 
the rest of Manchester.  The target hardening rate is lowest in the lowest burglary 
wards throughout but with rises to converge with that in the rest of Manchester by 
2004/05. This implies that target hardening, although initially missing the worst areas, 
has increasingly been channelled into the highest crime areas during the last two 
years, although there are still anomalies. 
 
Figure 3 Target hardening activity by burglary level 
Target Hardening Rate by Burglary Level
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Notes High burglary rates (top 4 wards) exceeding 1 standard deviation above the mean in: 
2002/03 >65.9 burglaries per 1,000 households 
2003/04 >64.6 burglaries per 1,000 households 
2004/05 >49.9 burglaries per 1,000 households 
 
 
A further question is that of what has happened to burglary rates in wards that had the 
highest levels of target hardening. To explore this, two groups of wards were 
identified. The first group were those with very high target hardening rates (i.e. 
significantly above the mean in two of the four years). The six wards that met this 
criterion (with their rank out of 32 on their overall share of burglary in brackets) were 
Ancoats and Clayton(4), Bradford(8), Levenshulme(10), Moss Side(11), Old Moat(3) 
and Withington(1). 
 
 A second group of ‘high levels of target hardening’ was defined as those with at least 
one year of significantly high target hardening. Five wards fell into this group, 
namely, were Brooklands (31), Burnage(15), Chorlton Park (21), Gorton South(7) and 
Harpurhey(4). 
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Figure 4 shows the burglary rates for each group in each year. There is evidence here 
that the wards with the highest rates for target hardening saw the greater reductions in 
burglary in each of the three years. 
 
Figure 4  Burglary change for Wards with different levels of target hardening 
Burglary Change by Target Hardening Level
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Notes: TH = Target Hardening activity 
 Rest of M = Rest of  Manchester City 
 
 
 
The two Target Wards 
 
The association between burglary rates and target hardening was not particularly 
strong in Longsight and Harpurhey. These were ranked 9th and 13th, respectively, on 
target hardening but 2nd and 4th on domestic burglary (Table 1). Table 2 shows the 
burglary rate in each ward for each year and expresses this as a ratio to the burglary 
rate in the rest of Manchester.  
 
In the two target wards, the burglary rate has reduced year-on- year (Table 2). In the 
rest of Manchester, the burglary rate remained stable between 2002/03 and 2003/04 
but then fell dramatically between 2003/04 and 2004/05. This meant that in relative 
terms the two target wards improved their position vis-à-vis the rest of Manchester 
between 2002/03 and 2003/04. This is revealed in the lower values for the burglary 
ratios between the two wards and the rest of Manchester in these two years. Thus 
more progress was made and a small convergence occurred between the two target 
wards and the rest of Manchester in this period. However, in Harpurhey, the burglary 
ratio increased between 2003/04 and 2004/05 indicating increasing divergence with 
the rest of Manchester.  
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Table 2 Burglary rates and ratios 
 
Harpurhey Longsight Rest of Manchester 
Year Burglary Rate 
Per 1000 
Households 
 
Burglary 
Ratio 
Burglary 
Rate 
Per 1000 
Households 
Burglary 
Ratio 
Burglary 
Rate 
Per 1000 
Households 
Burglary 
Ratio 
2002/03 67.3 1.38 74.1 1.51 48,9 1.00 
2003/04 65.8 1.34 72.5 1.48 48.9 1.00 
2004/05 51.5 1.43 59.2 1.40 36.1 1.00 
 
Table 3 shows target hardening rates and ratios in the two target wards and in relation 
to the rest of Manchester. There is a clear difference between the two wards in these 
rates over time.  Harpurhey is characterised by initial intensive activity in 2001/02 but 
then reducing rates in 2002/03 and 2003/04 followed by an increase in 2004/05. 
Longsight displays a more stable pattern in the level of target hardening throughout 
the period. The position in the rest of Manchester was different again. Here target 
hardening activity was relatively low in 2001/02, doubled in 2002/03, rose again in 
2003/04 and reduced slightly in 2004/05. The target hardening ratios were generally 
higher in the two target wards than in the rest of Manchester but fluctuate over time, 
particularly in Harpurhey. 
 
Table 3 Target hardening rates and ratios 
 
Harpurhey Longsight Rest of Manchester 
Year Target 
Hardening 
Rate 
Per 1000 
Households 
Target 
Hardening 
Ratio 
Target 
Hardening 
Rate 
Per 1000 
Households 
Target 
Hardening 
Ratio 
Target 
Hardening 
Rate 
Per 1000 
Households 
Target 
Hardening 
Ratio 
2001/02 35.1 2.97 20.4 1.72 11.8 1.00 
2002/03 23.4 1.04 27.0 1.20 22.5 1.00 
2003/04 7.4 0.28 31.4 1.21 25.8 1.00 
2004/05 30.9 1.29 31.0 1.30 23.8 1.00 
 
A more detailed picture can be generated by examining changes by quarterly time 
period. To illustrate this, three measures are brought together in Figure 5. The top line 
shows the cumulative percentage of properties target hardened within both wards for 
each quarterly period between 2003/04 and 2004/05. The middle line is the burglary 
ratio between the two target wards (combined) and the rest of Manchester City. If the 
burglary rate in the two wards was identical to that in the rest of the City then this line 
would be superimposed on the horizontal line at ratio value 1.0.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
Figure 5 Change in burglary and target hardening relative to rest of Manchester 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Note: Period covered is quarter 1 financial year 2003/04 to quarter 4  
           financial year 2004/05 
 
 
The lower line is the target hardening ratio between the two target wards and the rest 
of Manchester City. When this line dips to below 1.0 it means that the target 
hardening rate was lower in the two wards than in the rest of Manchester. In other 
words there was a greater prevalence of target hardening activity in areas outside of 
the two wards.  
 
In only three of the 8 quarters was target hardening relatively higher in the two wards 
than elsewhere. In quarter two and even more so in quarters three and five the target 
hardening rate was substantially higher in the rest of the City than in the two wards.  
Undoubtedly this would go some way to explain lack of convergence in burglary rates 
between these two wards and the rest of Manchester as indicated by the middle line. 
The relative position does improve for the two wards in quarters 7 and 8 but this is not 
enough to reduce the gap with the rest of the City. To do so would require 
redistributing substantially some of the target hardening from the rest of Manchester 
into these two higher burglary communities. 
 
This analysis and strategic view of resources and needs would not be possible without 
data on target hardening. Bringing the two together in this way introduces a new 
dimension in the management and targeting of crime prevention. 
 
Disaggregate spatial analysis 
 
The availability of disaggregate data enabled intra-ward variations in burglary and 
target hardening to be examined. A more detailed examination of the alignment 
between burglary and target hardening was carried out by producing a Resource 
Targeting Table (RTT). 
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An RTT is an innovative technique for identifying how much of a problem (domestic 
burglary) is concentrated in varying proportions of the street network. It can be used 
to pose questions such as: what proportion of streets would need to be brought into a 
target hardening programme to tackle 30% of the City or the ward’s burglary 
problem? 
 
An RTT for Harpurhey appears in Table 4. It covers the period April 2002 through 
March 2005. It compares the proportion of burglaries per street with the number of 
streets in each ward. There is also an additional column to compare the proportion of 
burglaries per street to the proportion of target hardening per street.  
 
From this table it is evident that burglary is concentrated in a small number of streets 
in the ward. The top row shows that one street in Harpurhey had 43 burglaries; the 
second row that there were two streets with 31 burglaries each. The top 16 burgled 
streets (4.7% of all streets) contained 26.4% of all burglaries in the ward and 18.5% of 
all target hardening. There were also 33 streets (10% of all streets) in Harpurhey with 
no burglaries, and 6% of all target hardening in the ward occurred in these streets. 
 
The RTT tells us that the target hardening was broadly in the right areas but that the 
correlation between target hardening and burglary at street level was far from perfect.  
Although covering several years RTTs can be produced for shorter periods to monitor 
how far target hardening is being channelled into areas of risk. Whether or not the 
ward had its fair share of target hardening is, of course, another matter. 
 
Another way to measure the alignment between where burglaries occur and where the 
target hardening is being channelled is to calculate the Index of Dissimilarity (IoD) 
between the two distributions. The formula for its derivation at Census Output Area 
level is: 
 
IOD= 0.5 ∑ | bi/B - ti/T | 
Where: 
bi is the number of burglaries in Output Area i  
B is the number of burglaries in Manchester  
ti is the number of target hardened properties in Output 
Area i and T is the number of target hardened properties in  
Manchester  
IOD = 0.1 minimum dissimilarity 1.0 maximum dissimilarity 
 
The IoD compares the distribution of one population with that of another. It has been 
used in social geography to explore the assimilation or segregation of different social 
and ethnic groups (Duncan and Duncan, 1955). Its value ranges from zero (no 
difference in the distributions) to a maximum of 100 (maximum dissimilarity). To 
illustrate how the measure can be interpreted,  if the distribution of target hardened 
properties across census Output Areas is compared with that of burglaries and the IoD 
value between these two distributions is 30 then 30% of the target hardening activity 
would have to shift to alternative Output Areas to match the distribution of the 
burglaries. This could provide a useful diagnostic for guiding the distribution of 
proactive target hardening.  
Table 4 Resource Targeting Table (RTT) for Harpurhey (April 2002 – March 2005) 
 
Burglaries 
Per Street 
Number 
of 
Burglaries 
Number 
of 
Streets 
Number 
of 
Properties 
Target 
Hardened 
Percentage 
of 
Burglaries 
Percentage 
of Streets 
Percentage 
of Target 
Hardened 
Properties 
Cumulative 
Number of 
Burglaries 
Cumulative 
Number of 
Streets 
Cumulative 
Number of 
Target 
Hardened 
Properties 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
of 
Burglaries 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
of Streets 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
of Target 
Hardened 
Properties 
43 43 1 22 3 0.3 2 43 1 22 2.7 0.3 2.4 
31 62 2 25 4 0.6 3 105 3 47 6.6 0.9 5.0 
30 30 1 10 2 0.3 1 135 4 57 8.5 1.2 6.1 
28 28 1 7 2 0.3 1 163 5 64 10.3 1.5 6.8 
27 27 1 10 2 0.3 1 190 6 74 12.0 1.7 7.9 
26 52 2 33 3 0.6 4 242 8 107 15.2 2.3 11.4 
25 25 1 15 2 0.3 2 267 9 122 16.8 2.6 13.0 
24 24 1 7 2 0.3 1 291 10 129 18.3 2.9 13.8 
23 46 2 18 3 0.6 2 337 12 147 21.2 3.5 15.7 
22 44 2 18 3 0.6 2 381 14 165 24.0 4.1 17.6 
19 38 2 8 2 0.6 1 419 16 173 26.4 4.7 18.5 
18 18 1 6 1 0.3 1 437 17 179 27.5 4.9 19.1 
17 17 1 6 1 0.3 1 454 18 185 28.6 5.2 19.8 
16 32 2 16 2 0.6 2 486 20 201 30.6 5.8 21.5 
15 75 5 72 5 1.5 8 561 25 273 35.3 7.3 29.2 
14 28 2 10 2 0.6 1 589 27 283 37.1 7.8 30.3 
13 13 1 4 1 0.3 0 602 28 287 37.9 8.1 30.7 
12 36 3 15 2 0.9 2 638 31 302 40.2 9.0 32.3 
11 44 4 26 3 1.2 3 682 35 328 42.9 10.2 35.1 
10 70 7 31 4 2.0 3 752 42 359 47.4 12.2 38.4 
6 to 9 366 52 214 23 15.1 23 1118 94 573 70.4 27.3 61.3 
1 to 5 470 217 305 30 63.1 33 1588 311 878 100.0 90.4 93.9 
0 0 33 57 0 9.6 6 1588 344 935 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total 1588 344 935 100 100.0 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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2002/3 0.53 0.51 0.31 
2003/4 0.44 0.18 0.44 
2004/5 0.39 0.14 0.29 
 
IoD values have been calculated between the distributions of burgled and target 
hardened properties across Census OAs for each year. These appear in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 The Index of Dissimilarity for Manchester Output Areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Longsight, the IoD between target hardening and burglary fell from 0.51 in 
2002/03 to 0.18 by 2003/04 and further still to 0.14 by 2004/05.  This suggests that 
over time target hardening activity was increasingly being channelled into areas 
affected by burglary. Thus in 2002/03 51% of protected properties would have needed 
to shift OAs to reflect the distribution of burglaries but only 14% in 2004/05. 
Although this was in line with the  trend in Manchester as a whole it was markedly 
stronger in Longsight. 
 
In Harpurhey, there was less change in the  spatial mismatch between target hardening 
activity and burglary; a moderate increase was observed between 2002/03 and 
2003/04 with a return to the 2002/03 pattern by 2004/05. 
 
In both wards, there was a closer alignment between target hardening and burglary 
than in Manchester generally.  
 
Although the IoD gives a general indication of the spatial alignment of crime 
prevention with crime further work is needed to explore the feasibility of applying this 
measure to residential streets and other spatial entities to guide resource allocation. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This research examined patterns of domestic burglary and target hardening activity 
across the City of Manchester and included a more in-depth analysis of change 
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affecting two inner Manchester wards with relatively high levels of domestic 
burglary, namely, Harpurhey and Longsight. 
 
Combining data on target hardening and burglary has undoubtedly produced new 
insights on how the targeting of crime prevention measures accords with crime risk. 
This information can be used better align resources to needs. 
 
There is a need to develop a more systematic approach to capturing data on policy 
interventions. But to do this effectively requires vision and commitment as well as 
ownership of the task. 
 
Even if the principle of capturing such information is agreed there are still a  number 
of questions about how such information can be generated and maintained, by whom, 
for whom and at what cost. For example: 
  How can crime prevention activity be categorised?  How can one identify systematically what interventions are being 
implemented, where and when?  How can the amount of crime prevention that is being delivered (i.e. the 
dosage) be quantified?  How far is its capture fundamentally different from that of recording crime?  Who will collect such data?  How much will it cost to do this well? (systematically and accurately)  Are there examples of good practice in capturing policy data that can be 
shared across agencies? 
 
Clearly one dilemma is the sheer volume of information that would need to be 
captured and the number of agencies and gatekeepers who would need to be 
approached. Some form of prioritisation would need to be made about what to collect 
and what to update. This might be based on an assessment of the importance, size and 
expected impact of policy interventions on crime. It might be necessary to distinguish 
‘major’ or high priority policy interventions from minor initiatives just as distinctions 
can be made between serious criminal offences and misdemeanours. 
 
Before embarking on these tasks a case would need to be made for doing so in terms 
of proof of concept. The value that the analysis of crime prevention activity data 
generates over and above that gained solely from crime data would have to be 
demonstrated. Even if this is achieved, questions remain about which agency would 
assume responsibility for doing so, how much it would cost to collect and maintain 
and how funding would be provided. 
 
One way forward might be to make the recording of consistent information on 
interventions a standard procedure for policy implementation teams. For example, 
there is not any requirement to register policy interventions in the same way that one 
would legally have to register births and deaths or any standard conventions for doing 
so. One argument that could be made is that any policy interventions paid for wholly 
or largely by public finances should be subjected to a registration process that could 
be the vehicle for generating consistent policy data. If this becomes a routine activity 
there could be substantial benefits in terms of a more rational delivery of policy, 
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improved performance monitoring and a supply of policy data for evaluation 
exercises. 
 
This study has not been without its limitations. Firstly, only one intervention, target 
hardening, has been examined. Many other policies may be operative in an urban 
neighbourhood that could potentially influence offender decision-making and the 
burglary rate. These include other projects tackling acquisitive property crime, police 
initiatives targeting prolific offenders, youth diversion schemes, regeneration 
programmes and so on. The collection of data from these was beyond the scope of this 
project.  
 
Secondly, the target hardening data did not include details of what form of target 
hardening was supplied and how much was spent at each address. This precluded the 
derivation of a policy dosage or intensity target hardening measure that could be 
brought into the analysis. 
 
Thirdly, the data provides scope to track the progress of individual properties that 
have been burgled and subsequently target hardened. This can be used to identify if 
they are subsequently victimised and if so how long they remain free of burglary. 
Survival analysis could be applied to compare ‘treated’ properties to those that are not 
protected through target hardening. There may also be spatial variations in the 
effectiveness of target hardening as a means of reducing risk. These, together with 
additional hypotheses will be the subject of further research. 
 
Despite these its limitations, this study has at least raised an awareness of the scale of 
additional data capture and  the complexity of the analysis required to fully 
incorporate policy data into crime analysis. 
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